Recent research indicates that the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) approximately describes the behavior of major dollar exchange rates during the post-1973 float. The present analysis examines the profitability of currency futures trading rules that assume that spot exchange rates can be adequately modeled as driftless random walks. Two random walk currency futures trading rules are simulated over all available data from the period 1984-2003. In both cases, the investor buys currencies selling at a discount and sells those selling at a premium, as the RWH implies. The two rules differ only in the way they allocate the hypothetical investor's resources among long and short foreign currency positions. Results show that an investor who used these trading strategies over the past decade would have enjoyed large cumulative gains, although periods of profit were interrupted by periods of substantial loss. The findings encourage the hope that profitable random-walk-based strategies for currency futures trading can be devised.
I. Introduction and Literature Review
A growing body of research indicates that the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) approximately describes the behavior of major dollar exchange rates during the post-1973 float.
1 This suggests that the RWH might be a useful foundation upon which to construct a currency futures trading
program. Approximately twenty years ago, Thomas (1986) published an article in the Journal of Futures Markets describing a rule for trading foreign exchange futures contracts. The rule was simple: the only thing the speculator needed to do was to examine short term interest rates in two countries, then buy (respectively, sell) foreign currency if the foreign interest rate was above (respectively, below) the corresponding US rate. This strategy is equivalent to buying foreign currencies that sell at a discount in the futures market, and selling currencies that sell at a premium. In essence, the investor bets the futures market's implicit forecast of a change in the spot rate is incorrect, as it will be if spot rates evolve as random walks. When the price of a commodity describes a driftless random walk, the current spot price is an unbiased predictor of the future spot price. That is, the current spot rate systematically neither overestimates nor underestimates the future spot rate. If the futures market price of such a commodity equals the expected future spot price, then the spot and future prices should be equal. If they are not, either futures market prices contain risk premia, or future-market participants believe they can forecast the future spot price of a commodity better than the random walk model can. Despite its simplicity, the rule had been historically very profitable. As always, one explanation for these favorable results was implicit data mining. When many researchers look historically at many
1 Taylor (1982) shows that there may be weak persistence in changes in the dollar/pound exchange rate. This is consistent with empirical evidence that simple filters are profitable in foreign exchange markets. See Dolley and Shafer (1983) . Poole (1967) evaluates the evidence for pre-1973 floating rates, and draws a similar conclusion. different trading rules, some are bound to work, at least work when applied to historical data. But post-sample, many such rules collapse. The purpose of this article is to see if the profits reported in 1983 persisted during the twenty years that have passed subsequent to publication of the trading rule in the Journal of Futures Markets.
Mounting evidence indicates that it is difficult for any exchange-rate forecasting model to significantly outperform the RWH. 2 Most importantly to our purpose, Bilson (1981) , Bilson and Hseih (1983) , Huang (1984) , and others, have shown that the economic theory relating interestrate differences among countries to subsequent exchange rate changes (uncovered interest-rate parity) seems to have broken down during the recent float. As a consequence, exchange-rate changes are no later governed by international interest differentials. Hacche and Townsend (1981) and Meese and Rogoff (1983 a and b) have demonstrated that other plausible economic theories, such as purchasing power parity and the monetary model, also add little to random walk forecasts of exchange rates, at least at horizons of less than a year. These studies all reported strong rejections of uncovered interest-rate parity. Subsequent studies have confirmed these results. 3 There is also an active theoretical literature, which attempts to determine if the failure of uncovered interest parity is due to risk aversion or market segmentation rather than market inefficiency. 4 In contrast, Roll and Yan (2000) suggest that forward exchange rates are unbiased predictors of subsequent spot rates and there is really no forward premium puzzle. The puzzle arises because the forward rate, the spot rate, and the forward premium follow nearly nonstationary time series processes. These theological issues will not be addressed in this paper.
2 See Mussa (1979) , Meese and Singleton (1982) or Meese and Rogoff (1983 a and b) , Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) , Flood and Rose (2002) , MacDonald (2002) , and Chinn and Meredith (2004) .
3 Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996) provide a review of the literature on this topic. 4 Fama (1984) , Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) and Bekaert and Hodrick (1992) .
If dollar exchange rates evolve as approximate random walks, the mean absolute percentage deviations between spot and future exchange rates (Table I) also represent the expected rates of return from following a random walk trading strategy of buying futures contracts on currencies that are selling at a discount to the spot price, and selling currency futures that are priced at a premium. 5 We compare these predicted profits to the actual profitability of random walk trading and find that during the last two decades of floating rates, on average only about one-third of the observed difference between spot and futures exchange rates has been justified by subsequent exchange rates changes. In short, the trading rule has continued to produce profits that appear disproportionate to their associated risks.
In section II we review the trading rule, and its economic foundations. Section III contains data description and examines the historical data. Sections IV extend the original analysis, considering more sophisticated ways of implementing the basic strategy. The concluding section discusses the implementations for hedgers and traders.
II. Research Methodology

II.1 Predicted and Actual Profits from Random Walk Trading
The trading strategies described in Section I are all based on the RWH-derived assumption that the current exchange rate is an approximately unbiased estimate of the future spot rate. If this is so, the expected profit from buying/selling a currency using a futures contract equals its associated discount/premium. This section compares the expected and actual rates of return realized by an investor who followed such a RWH-based strategy, using each of the six major currencies that typically sell at a significant discount or premium from the spot.
II.2 Random Walk Trading
Suppose that starting at time t , a spot foreign currency exchange rate evolves independently of its previous values, or of any economic variables that were observable at time t . In common parlance (if somewhat inaccurately), the exchange rate evolves as a random walk. We can easily derive the expression describing the profits from currency futures speculation if exchange rates evolve this way. 
It is convenient to rewrite this as
where 1 ! t FX is the spot rate at next time period and t FX is the spot rate at this time period. The spot rate is quoted as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. The first term on the right hand side is the capital gain or loss associated with exchange rate changes and it depends on the percentage change in the exchange rate, and on the quantity of foreign exchange rate owned. The latter, in turn, depends on the foreign interest rate, When the foreign rate exceeds the domestic rate, buying foreign currency is called a positive carry trade. When the foreign currency interest rate is less than the domestic rate, buying foreign currency is a negative carry.
If exchange rates evolve as different random walks, the expected change in the exchange rate is zero. Then the expected return equals the carry. To put it succinctly, " #
There is an economic theory, the uncovered interest parity hypothesis that asserts you cannot treat the spot exchange rate as being a simple, driftless random walk. Instead, according to uncovered parity, on average, the capital gain or loss associated with foreign exchange rate changes will just offset the carry. Or, to put it more succinctly,
" #" 
where a and b are parameters and t u is a normally distributed random error term. The left hand side represents the actual rate of return from the purchase of a currency futures contract. The right hand side variable represents the expected profit if the RWH is correct. Thus equation (3) compares the RWH-predicted profits from holding a currency contract during the quarter preceding its expiration, to the profit actually realized by following that strategy. According to the RWH, 1 b $ or exchange rate changes are unrelated to spreads; according to the uncovered interest parity condition, 0 b $ and then there are no profits to be made using the random walk trading rule, except by chance.
III. Data Description
We collected quarterly future and spot prices from Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) InfoTech CD. Our samples are from the first quarter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 2003 and for British pound, Euro, Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, Australian dollar, and Japanese yen. All prices are quoted per US dollar. The French franc was dropped, as it vanished on Jan 1, 2000 when the Euro came into existence. The Euro is treated as the successor currency for the Deutsche mark. Despite ample empirical evidence advancing the random walk model as the best tool available for forecasting dollar exchange rates, for most currencies, IMM futures prices seldom equal the contemporaneous spot exchange rates. Table I shows the mean absolute percentage deviations between spot and the futures exchange rates, at a quarterly horizon, over the 1984-2003 periods. The differences have been substantial for all currencies.
The regression statistics, in each case estimated using all available data from 1984-2003, are summarized in Table II . As predicted, the estimated slope coefficients are generally close to zero. Unfortunately, the low coefficients of determination and the high standard errors of the estimated slope terms demonstrate that the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are imprecise. For four of the six currencies the regression estimates are not powerful enough to decisively reject either hypothesis-random walk or unbiasness -in favor of the other. However, it is fair to say that the weight of the evidence presented in Table II Equation (1) was re-estimated using SUR over the 69 observations common to all of the six currencies, which yielded 414 pooled data points. The SUR results in Table III show that all of the beta coefficients are greater than unity and all are significantly greater than zero at standard levels of statistical significance. Uncovered interest parity can be rejected in favor of RWH. These results confirm the early studies of Hansen and Hodrick (1980) , Bilson (1981), and Fama (1984) and the many subsequent studies of the uncovered interest rate parity condition. A joint test of the hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients are zero is firmly rejected with this data. The fact that the regression coefficient is greater than unity means that the expected return from this strategy exceeds the interest rate differential. In other words, the trader not only benefits from the higher foreign interest rate (dividend yield) but also from the appreciation of the exchange rate against the dollar (the capital gain.) When the foreign interest rate is below the US rate, the trader will borrow the foreign currency and invest in dollars. Since the regression coefficient is greater than unity, this strategy will also benefit from a dividend yield and the appreciation of the dollar against the foreign currency.
Unfortunately, even using SUR the estimates of slope remained imprecise. To secure a further gain in efficiency, Equation (1) was re-estimated using the SUR procedure while constraining the estimated slope terms to be equal for all six currencies. The result was
where standard error of coefficient is reported in the bracket under each coefficient. As was the case twenty years ago, the regression result is inconsistent with uncovered interest rate parity ( 0 b $ ), but consistent with the random walk hypothesis ( 1 b $ and 0 a $ ). The failure of the uncovered interest parity to hold is one of the great puzzles in international finance. 6 According to this regression, in an average quarter, exchange rates moved by approximately 39% of the amount indicated by the futures-market discount or premium; therefore, on average 61% of the quarterly discount or premium has not been justified by subsequent exchange-rate changes. This makes us optimistic that the random walk trading rule may have continued to work after it was published in 1986. To confirm this, we have examined the profitability of the trading rule.
IV. Simulated trading results
For many economists and for all investors, the profitability of trading rules is likely to be more In the second trading rule, "square-dollar," the investor divides her resources equally between buying and selling foreign currencies. This is an attempt to insulate the portfolio's return from the general movement of dollar exchange rates. In each period, the total dollar value of currency the investor purchases for future delivery equals the dollar value of foreign currency she sells for future delivery. Accordingly, $0.5M is deployed to sell currency futures that are offered at a premium to spot, and $0.5M is allocated to buying foreign currency futures. If both buy and sell candidates are not available, then no position is taken. As before, margin of $0.15M is allocated to each contract. We assume the investor can buy or sell fractional currency futures contracts, and the brokerage fee is assumed to be $10 per contract bought or sold, or $20 per round trip. This strategy helps to show if the profits associated with random walk currency trading are exclusively associated with US dollar exchange rate change. Moreover, because dollar exchange rates have generally been more volatile over the past decade than cross exchange rates have, the second rule reduces the risk of currency futures trading from the perspective of a dollar-based investor.
The trading simulations that follow are based on the following assumptions: (ii) In each quarter, futures contracts on a total of $1,000,000 of foreign currency are bought or sold, valued at the futures prices on the date the option is opened. This generally requires assuming that fractional contracts can be purchased. The rate of return computations assume that an investor posts $150,000, or 15%, of the initial dollar value of her position as margin. This represents approximately three times the required initial margin, and approximately five times the required maintenance margin, for the typical portfolio simulated. This relatively conservative strategy is chosen to avoid margin calls.
(iii) Normally, large account holders will satisfy 70-90% of their margin requirements by posting Treasury bills. The interest income they will earn is not generally accounted for in what follows; that is, the reported rates of return are based on trading profits only.
Therefore, to find the approximate total return to capital invested in trading strategy, about 70-90% of the three month Treasury bill rate should be added to the reported trading profit.
(iv) Transaction costs are assumed to be $20 per round trip, per contract. This probably exaggerates their drag on trading profits. Currently, discount brokers typically charge retail customers as little as $8 for a round-trip trade.
In the first simulation, imaginary equal-dollar-valued positions are taken in each of the six currencies. The random walk strategy adopts a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts are always purchased, and those selling at a premium are always sold. The resulting portfolio positions are shown for each quarter, 1984-2003, in Table IV . Often, Euro, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen are sold, while
Australian dollar, Canadian dollars, and British pounds are purchased. That is, the futures markets often predicted that the Euro, Swiss franc, and Japanese yen will appreciate and the pound, Canadian dollar, and Australian dollar will depreciate, against the US dollar. A total of 465 trades are simulated; 274 or 59% are profitable. Each currency produces a cumulative profit over the twenty-year period. Table V This suggests that the trading rule may be sensitive to general dollar trends.
The second random walk trading rule is designed to show whether the profitability of the first resulted only from capturing the dollar "bull market" of 1990-1998. It accomplished this by constructing "square dollar" positions 7 -the investor's resources are equally divided between long and short dollar positions. The "square dollar" portfolio is both long and short of foreign currencies, so that the net dollar value of the portfolio is zero. In essence, the investor places a 7 In a square dollar strategy an attempt is made to minimize risk. Half of the resources are invested in long contracts and half in short contracts. In theory, if something dramatic happens, this strategy would minimize any ill effects of a large move in either direction. Using a square dollar approach should theoretically be safer and reduce the chances for a margin call. This probably will be at the cost of a lower return. See Atkins and Basu (2003) .
series of bets on how cross exchange rates -for example, the Euro/Swiss franc or British pound/Japanese yen rates -will evolve, rather than betting on the course of dollar exchange rates. This should substantially insulate the portfolio's return from general dollar exchange rate trends. Incidentally, it also should reduce the risk of random walk trading from a dollar-based investor's perspective.
The quarterly positions taken by the "square dollar" portfolio are also documented in Table IV . If a currency was bought and sold according to the first trading rule, then it was also bought and sold during the corresponding period by the "square dollar" rule. The scale of the overall portfolio -$1,000,000 worth of currency bought or sold -was also the same. Thus, the second trading rule differed from the first only in the division of resources among currency positions. This is roughly less than half the rate of return registered by the equally-weighted portfolio (18.53%). 8 This suggests that the random walk strategy benefits from taking outright dollar positions, but that dollar exchange rate trends do not explain all of the observed profits. Betting against discounts or premia in futures-market cross exchange rates is also profitable from 1984-
2003.
As can be seen, both trading rules produce cumulative profits during the approximately 20-year period that has elapsed since the trading rules were published. The first trading rule produces an information ratio (profit divided by standard deviation) of 26.0%. The second produced an information ratio of 17.6%. During the same period, a buy and hold position in the US stock market (the S&P 500 futures contracts) produced an information ratio of 16.0%, after allowing for $20 round trip commissions each quarter ($80/year per contract).
The final topic considered is the risk of the currency futures trading strategies. The discussion is complicated by two factors. First, the gross variability of the profit streams simulated above depends on the degree of leverage employed. The apparent risk of the strategies can be reduced by posting more than $150,000 per period in margin. More substantially, the analysis of the strategies is plagued by the difficulty of partitioning risking into their systematic and non-systematic components. Measuring systematic risk requires first identifying the market portfolio. US equity prices are commonly used in the finance literature as a proxy for the market portfolio. Despite the theoretical inadequacies of this approach, that practice is adopted in the followings:
Total returns to currency portfolios have been computed by adding 80% of the 30-day Treasury bill yield (applied to the assumed investment of $150,000 per period) to the trading profits. The return to holding US common stocks is measured by changes in the Standard and
Poor's Index of 500 stock prices plus dividend yield. All returns are before taxes. stock index intersect a line connecting the return/risk for both currency portfolios at point A (Figure 1) , which has the mean of 6.1% and standard deviation of 20.12%. At this point, the amount of investing capital is 103.87% in equally-weighted and -3.87% in square-dollar currency portfolios. The return/risk for both currency portfolios lies above the extension of a line connecting the return/risk realization for investments in 30-day Treasury bills and the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index after point A, or when we invest more than 103.87% in equallyweighted currency portfolio and the rest in square-dollar currency portfolio. 9 In conclusion, the return of S&P 500 and 30-day T-Bill combination falls below the portfolio of currency futures strategies when the investor shorts a little of the safer strategy (square dollar currency) and go long more than 100% of the riskier strategy (equally-weighted currency). Potentially more important than the gross variability of the currency portfolio' return streams are their correlations with returns to US common stock. The estimated correlation coefficients between the equallyweighted and the square-dollar returns and those to common stock investments are, respectively 16.75% and 18.09%. These low figures indicate that investors who hold US equity portfolios will have enjoyed substantial gains from diversifying using the currency portfolio simulated here. 10 (The trading rules themselves are correlated at 89.35%).
9 Treasury bills and the Standard and Poor's index proxy for the risk-free rate and the rate of return on the market portfolio, respectively. 10 The betas of the currency portfolios are estimated as 0.46 and 0.37 for the equally-weighted and square-dollar portfolios, respectively, with standard errors of 0.397 and 0.299. Accordingly, neither estimated beta is statistically significantly different from zero.
Suppose you have known in advance these means, volatilities and correlations; how will you have allocated your capital and risk efficiently between the three strategies to minimize variance of the portfolio? The minimal variance portfolio will allocate 79.69% to the stock market, -1.82% to equally-weighted currency trading, and 22.13% of its capital to square-dollar currency trading and the expected return of this portfolio will be equal to the mean quarterly return of S&P 500, which is 3.42%. Even though the stock market enjoyed a bull market of historic proportions, and even though these currency trading rules are simple and have been published within the futures trading community, currency trading is more attractive than investing in equities!
V. Conclusions
The simulations show that purchasing futures contracts on currencies priced at a discount and selling futures contracts priced at a premium has generally been a profitable trading strategy during the last two decades of floating exchange rates.
There are at least three reasonable interpretations of this result. First, futures market participants may have overestimated their ability to forecast exchange changes, producing unreasonable discounts and premia. A major objection to this interpretation is that it must assume that the currency futures markets were inefficient for an extended period. Violation of market efficiency is not necessary to explain the simulated trading results.
A second explanation postulates that, in equilibrium, the futures markets do not price currency for future delivery at the expected future spot exchange rate. Thus a portion of observed differences between spot and future exchange rates represents a risk premium. The major difficulty with this view is that it is unclear what factors are priced into this risk premium. Future developments in international asset pricing models may confirm or deny this interpretation of these empirical results.
A third possibility is that the results reported are due only to chance, and that the random walk trading strategy profits will evaporate in the future. Given that the strategies in this paper were tested once before, two decades ago, and that they continue to work well, such an explanation seems unlikely; but unfortunately, it cannot be entirely ruled out.
The simulation results have important implications for those willing to suspend disbelief, and tentatively conclude that the currency futures markets may be inefficient. Hedgerseconomic agents with natural foreign currency exposures -are one group that may find the simulation useful. Hedgers, who are naturally long "strong" currencies (i.e., those selling at premia), or naturally short "weak" currencies can have their cake and eat it too. Hedging, in this instance, involves selling currencies priced at a futures-market premium and buying those priced at a futures-market discount -a strategy that has been shown above to generally yield profits.
Hence, the hedger is compensated, in an expected return sense, for reducing his foreign exchange risk.
Borrowers can also benefit. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that these currencyfutures results can be interpreted as showing that borrowing in low-interest-rate countries and lending in high-interest-rate countries has generally been profitable over 1974 -2003 period (Thomas, 1986 . Borrowers have done better to borrow in "strong" (i.e., low interest rate) currencies; they have been well compensated for bearing the resulting exchange risk.
Lenders did better favoring "weak" (high interest rate) currencies.
The results are of obvious interest to speculators. The trading rules described in the body of the article were deliberately naïve, since they were designed to demonstrate that the foundation for a random walk trading strategy is secure. This would have been less clear if more complicated trading tactics were simulated. But even these simple strategies were profitable.
More sophisticated trading rules are certainly conceivable. For example, there is evidence that the spectrum of exchange-rate changes is not quite white noise. Exchange rates do not evolve as true random walks. Instead, there are weak positive correlations among current and lagged historical exchange rate changes (Taylor, 1982) . This suggests that local-trend following models may be useful devices for forecasting exchange rates. Such models can easily be grafted onto the basic trading strategy. In addition, risk-return efficient combinations of currency-futures positions can be constructed by using modern portfolio theory. 
Table IV Positions Taken
This table shows the number of future contracts traded based on equally-weighted currency and square-dollar positions in each of the six currencies. The random walk strategy adopts a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts were always purchased, and those selling at a premium were always sold. Equal presents equally-weighted currency strategy, which is implemented by investing equally in all six currencies and Square presents square-dollar strategy, which is implemented by investing resources equally divided between long and short dollar positions. The resulting portfolio positions are shown for each quarter, 1984-2003 Table V 
Equally-Weighted Portfolio Profit Summary
This table presents the number of trades, number of profitable trades, number of futures contracts traded, and cumulative profits in each of the six currencies from 1984-2003 based on equal-dollar-valued. The random walk strategy adopts a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts were always purchased, and those selling at a premium were always sold. Equally-weighted currency strategy is implemented by investing equally in all six currencies. 
Table VI Quarterly Profits Equally-Weighted Portfolio Strategy
This table shows the quarterly profits in each of the six currencies based on equal-dollar-valued positions. The random walk strategy adopts a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts were always purchased, and those selling at a premium were always sold. Equally-weighted currency strategy is implemented by investing equally in all six currencies. The resulting portfolio positions are shown for each quarter, 1984-2003 . Cumulative profit and loss is profit and loss accumulated over time. -2,632 -6,199 3,382 20,716 41,768 161,237 12/11/92 -29,065 -11,307 -6,742 -7,243 768 -12,582 -66,172 95,065 03/12/93 -11,960 -6,271 5,796 6,016 -8,224 -11,037 -25,680 69,385 06/11/93 11,544 4,713 -3,546 -6,704 18,862 8,289 33,157 102,542 09/10/93 4,453 6,039 -3,305 -5,720 336 8,345 10,148 112,690 12/10/93 -5,123 -8,455 -1,232 6,464 -4,477 -6,654 -19 This table shows the quarterly profits in each of the six currencies based on square-dollar-valued positions. The random walk strategy adopts a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts were always purchased, and those selling at a premium were always sold. Square-dollar strategy is implemented by investing resources equally divided between long and short dollar positions. The resulting portfolio positions are shown for each quarter, 1984-2003 This table shows the number of quarters, mean quarterly returns, and standard deviation of quarterly returns of 30-day treasury bills, common stock, equally-weighted currency, and square-dollar currency portfolios in British Pound, Swiss Franc, Euro, Canadian Dollar, Australian Dollar, and Japanese Yen from 1984 to 2003. To compute equally-weighted and square-dollar portfolios, the random walk strategy is adopted as a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts were always purchased, and those selling at a premium were always sold. Equally-weighted currency strategy is implemented by investing equally in all six currencies and square-dollar currency strategy is implemented by investing resources equally divided between long and short dollar positions. Total returns to currency portfolios have been computed by adding 80% of the three-month Treasury-Bill yield (applied to the assumed investment of $150,000 per period) to the trading profits. The return to holding US common stocks is measured by changes in the Standard and Poor's Index of 500 stock prices plus dividend yield. All returns are before taxes. This table shows mean quarterly returns and standard deviation of quarterly returns of 30-day treasury bills, common stock, equally-weighted currency, and square-dollar currency portfolios in British Pound, Swiss Franc, Euro, Canadian Dollar, Australian Dollar, and Japanese Yen from 1984 to 2003. To compute equally-weighted and square-dollar portfolios, the random walk strategy is adopted as a contrarian stance, selling "strong" and purchasing "weak" currencies. Foreign currency futures selling at discounts were always purchased, and those selling at a premium were always sold. Equally-weighted currency strategy is implemented by investing equally in all six currencies and square-dollar currency strategy is implemented by investing resources equally divided between long and short dollar positions. Total returns to currency portfolios have been computed by adding 80% of the threemonth Treasury-Bill yield (applied to the assumed investment of $150,000 per period) to the trading profits. The return to holding US common stocks is measured by changes in the Standard and Poor's Index of 500 stock prices plus dividend yield. All returns are before taxes.
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